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Abstract 
In this paper, we address the issue of illegal copying or counterfeiting of the original 
product and Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protections. The original product 
developer makes costly investment to deter piracy in a given regime of IPR protection. In 
the presence of a commercial pirate, we find that it is profitable for the original producer 
to accommodate the pirate when there is weak IPR protection, and deter when the IPR 
protection is strong. However, in the comparative statics analysis, we find that there is a 
non-monotonic relationship between the optimal level of deterrence (chosen by the 
original producer) and the degree of IPR protection in the economy. The relationship 
between the rate of piracy and IPR protection is found to be monotonically decreasing 
whereas the relationship between the rate of piracy and the quality of the pirated product 
turns out to be non-monotonic. On the other side, from the commercial pirate’s point of 
view, the most profitable way to survive in the market is to produce a pirated product of 
moderate quality. Our model also provided a possible explanation of varying piracy rates 
across countries/regions. 
 
Keywords: Piracy, Copyright violations, Raising rival’s cost, Deterrence, 
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1. Introduction  
The issue of copyright violations and intellectual property rights (IPR) protection is 
presently receiving a great deal of attention in various economic analyses. Copyright 
violations take place when there is piracy or illegal copying or counterfeiting of the 
original product. These products can be digital products (like software, music CDs, 
movie DVDs, video games etc.) or non-digital products i.e. regular items (like cloth, 
shoes, books, bags etc.). 1   In recent years, there is a renewed interest to study the 
implications of piracy, and mostly those of digital goods piracy because of the rapid 
advancement of digital copying technology. Conventional copying or counterfeiting of 
non-digital products (e.g. the fake brands of original goods), was always there in several 
markets and would continue to be there in future as well. But the growth of digital piracy 
is now posing an additional threat. Since digital piracy is a relatively new phenomenon 
compared to the conventional counterfeiting, a lot of recent studies have focused their 
attention on digital piracy. To study the implications of digital piracy, most of these 
studies considered a scenario where the pirates are mainly the end-users (see Conner and 
Rumelt (1991), Takeyama (1994), Shy and Thisse (1999), Chen and Png (2003), Bae and 
Choi (2006), Belleflame and Picard (2007) among many others).2 Except few studies (see 
Slive and Bernhardt (1998), Banerjee (2003), Poddar (2005), Kiema (2008)) the issue of 
commercial piracy (i.e. piracy for profit) has not been addressed adequately so far in the 
literature. Even if those few studies addressed commercial piracy, the explicit influence 
of exogenous IPR protection is never incorporated in the models. In view to that one of 
the main aims of this paper is to incorporate the impact of IPR protection against 
copyright violations in an environment of commercial piracy. The framework that is 
chosen here is a model of entry deterrence. We study strategic aspects related to entry 
accommodation and entry deterrence equilibrium in a framework where there is one 
                                                 
1 Globally counterfeiting activities have risen to 5-7% of world trade, or about $200 billion to $300 billion 
in lost revenue, according to some estimates for the European Union some years back (see Time Magazine 
2001). We believe that the figure has increased significantly in recent years due to the increase in digital 
piracy.  
 
2 For a good survey on information (digital) goods end-users piracy, see Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006).   
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incumbent original producer and a potential commercial pirate3. The strategic aspects 
leading to entry deterrence or entry accommodation under commercial piracy that have 
been so far studied in the literature, mostly used the “monitoring the pirate policy”; 
without any explicit reference of the extent of IPR protections that influences the decision 
of the copyright holder to deter or accommodate a pirate. In this paper we hope to fill in 
that gap in the literature.  In our model of commercial piracy, the strength (degree) of IPR 
protection and its impact on the economy plays a major role. It is also empirically 
observed that the degree and the enforcements of IPR protections vary greatly across 
countries/regions; and most widely between developed and developing countries.4 As a 
result, the rate of piracy or counterfeiting activities varies a great deal across countries or 
regions. We also want to accommodate that fact in our analysis and try to provide an 
explanation of the phenomenon 
We consider a model where there is an original product developer and a 
commercial pirate (i.e. who sells pirated goods for profits). The original producer can 
choose to deter or accommodate the pirate. The original producer’s decision depends on 
the degree of the IPR protection that prevails in the economy. Initially, the original 
product developer makes costly investment to stop or limit piracy. The basic assumption 
we use here is stopping piracy is a costly activity, but if such costly activity is actively 
undertaken, it raises the cost of piracy to the pirate. 5  In our framework, the local 
government/authority per se is not monitoring illegal piracy, but there is a general anti-
piracy law that exists in the economy, and this is what we define as IPR protections for 
copyrighted materials. 6 The original product developer takes the level/degree of the IPR 
                                                 
3 The model can also be extended to the case where there are many small competitive commercial pirates. 
 
4 For example, the software piracy rate across countries varies widely; it can be as high as more than 90% 
in countries like Vietnam, China and can be as low as 25% as in USA. All other countries have piracy rates 
in between these two extremes. (Source: See BSA and IDC Global Software 2007 for a detailed survey on 
piracy rates in different countries). 
 
5 In this regard, our model is similar to the economic analysis of Landes and Posner (1989) in the context of 
copyright law and to that of Salop and Scheffman (1987) in the context of raising rivals’ costs.   
 
6  As we said earlier, our approach to deter/limit piracy is different from the standard approach of 
monitoring the pirate by a central authority or the local government and imposing a fine if caught. The 
monitoring approach is already extensively studied in the literature of digital piracy, in particular, software 
piracy (see Banerjee (2003, 2006), Lopez-Cunat and Martinez-Sanchez (2007)). Recently, Kiema (2008) in 
his study on commercial piracy took a different approach and viewed the increased risk of punishment of 
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protection in the economy as given and then optimally invests to raise the cost of piracy 
of the pirate. IPR protections can be weak or strong and the original developer adjusts its 
deterrence level (hence the costly investment) accordingly in an optimal manner.7  
In this environment, we first characterize completely the entry deterrence and entry 
accommodation equilibrium. We find that in general, it is profitable for the original 
producer to accommodate the pirate when there is weak IPR protection, while deterring is 
profitable when the IPR protection is strong. Next question, we ask whether the level of 
deterrence set by the original producer and the degree of IPR protection are always 
substitutes or complements in deterring piracy. To answer this question, in the 
comparative statics analysis, we find that there is actually a non-monotonic relationship 
between the optimal level of deterrence (chosen by the product developer) and the 
degree/strength of IPR protection in the economy. In the case of accommodation, the 
optimal level of deterrence increases with the degree of IPR protection. In the case of 
deterrence, we see that when the reliability of the pirated product is not sufficiently high, 
i.e., when the products are already very differentiated, the original producer will give less 
effort for deterring entry, thus will reduce deterrence level when IPR protection increases. 
On the other hand, when the reliability of the pirated product is sufficiently high, i.e. 
when the products are not too differentiated, the original producer will actually raise the 
deterrence level till IPR protection increases to a certain level, and then reduce deterrence 
level when IPR protection increases sufficiently. Thus we observe a non-monotonicity 
between the level of deterrence and the strength of IPR protection as we move from the 
case of entry accommodation to entry deterrence.  In another finding, we observe that the 
relationship between the rate of piracy (appropriately defined) and the strength of IPR 
protection is monotonically decreasing, however, the relationship between the rate of 
piracy and the quality of the pirated product turns out to be non-monotonic again. 
Another interesting finding that comes out from our analysis is that, for a profitable 
piracy, the optimal strategy of the commercial pirate would be to produce a pirated 
version with moderate reliability. A commercial pirate will not be inclined to produce a 
                                                                                                                                                 
offering a pirate copy to a consumer causes an advertising cost to the commercial pirate whose value is 
chosen by the government.  
 
7 For some more studies on IPR protection and entry deterrence see Yao (2005) and Kim (2007).  
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version which is too low in quality or which is too close to the original product in terms 
of quality/reliability even if it can produce such varieties.  
Our results also provide a theoretical explanation to the varying rates of piracy 
across countries and regions, a phenomenon observed empirically. There exists empirical 
studies (see Gopal and Sanders (1998), Husted (2000), Marron and Steel (2000), Holm 
(2003), Fischer and Rodriguez (2005), Andres (2006)) to explain the varying (software) 
piracy rates across countries and regions, but to the best of our knowledge no theoretical 
framework has been developed so far to explain the same phenomenon. In our model, we 
find that the actual piracy rate depends on three parameters, namely, the consumers’ 
willingness to pay for the product, the quality of the pirated product and the strength of 
IPR protection that prevails in the economy. It is the interaction of these three parameters 
that defines the rate of piracy in an economy. In general, we would expect these three 
parameters to vary across countries/regions, which can very well explain the different 
piracy rates as well. 
Our analysis here encompasses both the digital and non-digital piracy. In that sense, 
this study can also be considered to be a general study on the implications of copyright 
violations. The main findings in our comparative statics analysis are empirically testable. 
For example, it is important to verify whether there indeed exists a non-monotonic 
relationship between the optimal level of deterrence (i.e. R&D activity chosen by the 
product developer to deter piracy) and the strength of IPR protection in the economy; or 
whether we can find a non-monotonic relationship between the perceived quality of the 
pirated product and the strength of IPR protection.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we provide the basic 
framework. In section 3, we completely analyze the entry accommodation and entry 
deterrence equilibrium. We do the comparative statics analysis in section 4. In section 5, 
we briefly analyze another variant of the model to check the robustness of our main 
findings. Section 6 discusses briefly on the welfare implications; and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. The Model of Commercial Piracy 
2.1 The Original Firm and the Pirate 
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Consider an original firm and a pirate. The pirate has the know-how or the 
technology to copy/counterfeit the original product. We assume the pirate produces 
copies, which are of lower quality than the original. The product quality of the pirated 
good (compared to original) is captured by the parameter q ,  1,0q . In the case of 
digital product, although the pirated copies are almost like original, they do not come 
with any guarantee or supporting services, thus making them inferior compared to the 
original. 
We consider a two-period model, where in the first period  1t , the original 
product developer undertakes costly investment in order to deter piracy. It adopts the 
following entry deterring strategy. It tries to deter the pirate by increasing the cost of 
copying, in particular, raising the marginal cost of producing a copy of the original.  The 
potential pirate appears in the market of the original product in the second time 
period . We assume the higher the entry deterring investment made by the original 
product developer in the first period, the higher would be the marginal cost of copying by 
the pirate, hence higher would be the deterrence level. The pirate if survives, competes 
with the original developer in prices by possibly producing a lower quality, albeit a 
cheaper product. We look for subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-period game and 
solve the game using the usual method of backward induction. 
 2t  
 
2.2 Costs and Profits  
We assume at , the cost of investment of the original product developer to 
choose the level of deterrence, 
1t
x , is given by   2 2oc x x . Thus, if the profit of the 
product developer at  is denoted by ,2t 2o op D  o 8 where op  is the price charged by 
the product developer and is the demand it faces, then the net profit of the developer at 
the end of the game is
oD
 2 2 2o oc x x    2o o  . When the level of deterrence is x , the 
marginal cost of production for the pirate will be cx , where c  is a parameter    
exogenously given (discussion on the interpretation of c follows in the next sub-section). 
0c
                                                 
8 For simplicity, we assume the marginal cost of production for the original firm is constant and normalized 
to zero. We also assume no discounting. 
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If the pirate is in the market at 2t  then its profit function becomes , 
where  is the price charged by the pirate and  is the pirate’s demand.  
 p pp cx D   p
                                                
pp pD
 
2.3 Interpretation of c 
We would like to interpret c  in the following way. c  is the degree of Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) protection in our model. In other words,  also defines the strength 
of legal enforcement to stop piracy and it is beyond the control of the original firm (i.e. 
the copyright holder). It is generally understood that the government or the regulatory 
authority can influence c . According to a recent study by Andres (2006), the strength of 
IPR protection mainly consists of two categories: membership in the international 
copyright treaties and enforcement provisions.
c
9 
Note that we have assumed a multiplicative form between c and the level of 
deterrence x that is chosen by the original firm. The multiplicative form is specifically 
chosen to figure out the explicit interaction between c and x. In an extreme situation, if 
, (i.e. zero enforcement by the government) piracy is absolutely costless to the 
pirate, no matter how much costly investment is undertaken by the original product 
developer. In this case, the original firm’s investment effort has no effect in deterring 
piracy. On the other hand, a positive c makes the investment effort of the original firm 
effective. Consequently, a high value of c  increases the cost of piracy to the pirate for a 
given level of entry-deterring investment by the original firm. Thus the multiplicative 
form implies that it is a joint responsibility of the government and the copyright holder to 
stop/limit piracy. If one party wants to free ride on the other party to save its own cost, 
then the net effect to limit piracy is zero.
0c
10  
 
9 Going by the definition and measure of the strength of IPR protections as discussed in Andres (2006), we 
can generally find a relatively high c  in the developed countries where piracy is taken as a serious crime; 
hence it raises the cost of piracy significantly. On the contrary, in most of the developing countries, we will 
probably find c  to be relatively low, because the enforcement policies against piracy may not be as strict, 
hence cost of piracy would remain relatively small. In international forums, like WTO, the discussion on 
the level of c (i.e. the level of IPR protections for a country) is a topic that is often debated among the WTO 
member and non-member countries.  
 
10 To see the impact (if there is any) of the functional form on the results, the additive case between c and x 
is discussed in section 5. 
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In this study we take c as an exogenous parameter, and study what would be the best 
entry-deterring strategy for the original product developer given an enforcement 
environment of IPR protection (i.e. given c).  
 
2.4 Consumers’ Preferences 
Consider a continuum of consumers indexed by  0,X  . X measures a 
consumer’s willingness to pay for the original product. A high value of X  means higher 
valuation for the product and low value of X  means lower valuation for the product.  
Therefore, one consumer differs from another on the basis of his/her valuation for the 
particular product. Valuations are uniformly with density 1   distributed over the interval 
0,  .11 Each consumer purchases at most one unit of the good. A consumer’s utility 
function is given as: 
if buys original product
if buys pirated product
0 if buys none,
o
p
X p
U qX p
  
12 
where op  and are the prices of the original and pirated product respectively.pp
13 
 
3. A Complete Characterization of Accommodation and 
Deterrence Equilibrium 
The original producer can accommodate entry or deter entry completely. We start by 
deriving demands of the product developer and the pirate. 
 
3.1 Deriving Demands of the Product Developer and the Pirate 
                                                 
0q  1
11 So the number of consumers is normalized to one. 
 
12 Note that  will eliminate the pirated product, while q  will make the two products identical. In 
our model  is never possible as we have assumed that the pirated good is of lower quality.  Also 
technically, 
1q 
 0,1q is needed so that demands, prices and profits are not indeterminate. 
 
13 The utility representation is borrowed from the standard model of vertical product differentiation in the 
literature (see Shaked and Sutton (1982), Tirole (1988)). 
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The demand for the original product and for the pirated product,  and , can be 
derived from the distribution of buyers as follows.  
oD pD
 
[Insert Figure 1] 
 
Recall that consumers are heterogeneous with respect to their values towards the 
product. Thus, the marginal consumer,X , who is indifferent between buying the original 
product and the pirated version is given by  o pX p q X p   , or     1o pX p p q   . 
The marginal consumer, , who is indifferent between buying the pirated product and 
not buying any product is given by qY
Y
 0pp   , or  pY p q . Thus, the demand for 
original product is 

     1 1 q 1o o p
X
x p p q

D d          and the demand for 
pirated product is

    1p o px q p q q1X
Y
D d p   
p
 .  
Note that we have implicitly assumed that  when we derive the demand 
functions as above. When this assumption does not hold true, the demand for pirated 
product becomes zero while the demand for original producer is 
oqp p
 o oD p   . Thus, 
we write the demand functions as the following: 
     
 
1 1       if 
                                       otherwise
o p o
o
o
q p p q qp
D
p
 
 
        
pp ,                                  (1) 
and 
   1       if 
0                                      otherwise
o p o
p
qp p q q qp p
D
    
p .                                                 (2) 
 
3.2 Price Competition in the Product Market 
In the second period, if the pirate operates, the two firms engage in a Bertrand price 
competition and choose the profit maximizing prices of the respective products. Note that 
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the pirate cannot earn positive profit by pricing below marginal cost. So without loss of 
generality we restrict our attention to . pp c x
The profit function of the pirate is    p p pp p cx   pD  and the profit function of 
the original firm in period 2 is  2o o o op p D  . When (which 
requires
pcx p qp  o
op cx q ),       1p p pp p cx o pqp p q q    . Clearly,  p pp  is strictly 
concave,      1 0q 
pp p p cx o
p qp cx q      and      1 0p op p p qpp q x q q  op c    . 
So the optimal choice of pp  is defined by   0p pp   , which gives     2p o op p qp cx  . 
When op cx q , the pirate has no demand since . Therefore, the reaction 
function of the pirate is the following: 
pp cx qp  o
    2       if 
any price     otherwise
o o
p o
qp cx p cx q
R p
cx
    
.                                           (3) 
To derive the reaction function of the original firm, we write  2o op  as 
    
2
      if 0
     if  
o o
o o
o o s
sf p pp
g p p p
  p    , 
where  
   o o of p p p   ,  op R  ; 
       1 1o o o pg p p q p p q        , op R  ; 
s pp p q . 
It is straightforward to verify that    s sf p g p  and that both  of p  and  are 
strictly concave. Next, we examine the signs of
 og p 
 0f  ,  sf p  and  sg p . We find that 
,  0 0f    
0  if 2
2
2
0  if 
0  if 
p
s p
p
p q
f p p q
p q



    
, and  
   
   
   
0   if 
=0    if 
0   if 
p
s p
p
1 2
1 2
1 2
  
p q q
q q
q
qg p p
p q q




 
 q



 
 
 
. Note 
that    1 2 2q qq q     .  
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Then, (1) when    1 2pp q q q   ,  since  of p  and  are strictly 
concave, and 0 ,
 og p
  0sf p    sg p  14  the optimal choice of op  is d  
  0og p  , w
efined by
veshich gi      1 2p q  o pp p p ; (2) when    1 2 2q q qpq p     , 
since  of p  and  og p  are strict e, ly concav  s  0 15 af p nd   0sg p  , the optim l 
cho
a
ice of op  is  o p s pp p p p q  ; (3) when 2pp q ce, sin  of p  and  og p  are 
strictly co  sncave,  0 and f p   0spg  , 16  the optimal choice of op  is defined 
by   0of p  es , which giv   2o pp p  . Therefore, the reaction function of the 
original producer can be summarized as 
 
      
   
1 2     if 1 2 ,
                        if 1 2 2,
2                           if 2.
p p
o p p p
p
p q p q q q
R p p q q q q p q
p q
 

 
        
                   (4) 
Note that if the price of the pirated product is high enough (i.e., 2pp q ), the original 
producer’s best response is to set monopoly price 2op  ; if the price of the pirated 
product is sufficiently low (i.e.,    1 2pp q q q   ), the original producer’s best 
response is to share the demand with the pirate; while it sets price o pp p q

such that 
there is no demand for the pirated product if the price of the pirated product is 
intermediate.  
Figure 2 plots the reaction functions for three cases:   1 2x q q c q   , 
   1 2q q c q x q     2c and 2x q c . But the pirate’s best response to op when 
op cx q  is omitted in the figure since the best response is any price no less than cx. In 
the first two cases, this does not have any effect on our analysis since the part of the 
                                                 
 o14 Since f p  is strictly concave and   0sf p  ,  f op , ] is strictly increasing in the region [0 sp
 o
. 
 
15 See the previous footnote. 
 
16 Since g p  is strictly concave and   0sg p  ,  og p  is strictly decreasing in the region  ,sp  . 
 
 10
pirate’s best response curve does not intersect the original producer’s best response curve. 
In the third case, it is clear that the equilibrium involves 2op   and =any pricepp cx . 
 
[Insert Figure 2] 
We thus distinguish three cases:    1 2x q q c q   , called accommodating 
strategy of the original producer,    1 2 2q q c q x q c    , called deterrence 
strategy, and 2x q c , called blockade strategy. 
When    1 2x q q c q   , the equilibrium prices are determined by 
    1 2o p pR p p q     and     2p o oR p qp cx  . It is then straightforward to 
obtain equilibrium prices 
       2 1 4 , 1 2o pp 4q cx q p q q cx           q   .               (5)  
The demand for the original product is given by     2 1 4 1oD q cx q q        , 
and the profit in the second stage is  
       2 22 2 1 4 1o x q cx q q         ;                                 (6) 
When    1 2q q c q x q    2c , the equilibrium prices are determined by 
 o p pR p p q  and     2p o oR p qp cx  . The equilibrium prices are then 
,o pp cx q p cx  .                                                (7)  
The demand for the original product is given by  oD q cx q   , and the profit in the 
second stage is  
   2o 2x cx q cx q    ;                                 (8) 
When 2x q c , the original producer charges the monopoly price 2op  .The 
demand for the original product is 1 2oD  , and the profit in the second stage is 
 2 4o x  .17                                                                (9) 
 
                                                 
17 Note that in each case we do not write the pirate’s demand and profit explicitly since only the product 
developer moves in the first stage. 
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3.3 Choice of Optimal Level of Deterrence by the Original Firm 
Now we move on to the first period of the game. In this period, the original firm 
decides on its optimal choice of the level of x  to deter piracy. Thus it maximizes its net 
profit  2 2 2o o o oc x x      2  with respect to x. We are going to derive the original 
firm’s choice of optimal level of deterrence. 
As a first step, we notice that 2x q c is strictly dominated by 2x q c . Since 
the expression of (8) is equal to 4  when evaluated at 2x q c , which means 
regarding 2x q c as a deterrence strategy or a blockade strategy makes no difference, 
we can ignore the blockade strategy when looking for the optimal level of deterrence.  
Next, we write the original firm’s profit function as  
    
  if 
 if 2
s
o
s
h x x x
x
l x x x q c
 
     , 
where 
       2 2 22 1 4 1 2h x q cx q q x         ,  x R  ; 
    2 2 2  l x cx q cx q x    , x R  ; 
   1 2sx q q c q   . 
It is straightforward to verify that    s sh x l x  and that  l x  is strictly concave. 
Moreover,  
 

 
2
2
2
0  if ,
0  if ,
0  if ,
c q
h x c q
c q

 
 
 
    
, which means that  h x  is strictly concave when 
 2 ,c q   while it is strictly convex when  q2 ,c   , where      2, 4 1q q q 2     . 
Next, we examine the signs of  0h ,  sh x ,  sl x and  2cl q . We find that 
,  0 0h   
 

 

2
2
2
0  if ,
0  if ,
0  if ,
s
c q
h x c q
c q
 
 
 
    
, and  
 
 
 
,
,
,
q
2
2
2
f 
f 
f 
c
0  i
0  i
0  i
s
c q
c q
l x
 
 
 

 
 
 
 ,  2 0l q c  , 
where     , 4 1 2q q q q      and    , 1q q q    . Note that 
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    , ,q q q ,       . Also, note that “  0 0h  ” means that the optimal level of 
deterrence must be strictly positive and that “  2l q c 0 ” means that the optimal level 
of deterrence must not be so high that the pirate is blockaded.  
Then, (1) when  ,q 2c   , since both  h x  and  l x  are strictly concave, 
and ,  0sh x    0sl x  18 the optimal choice of x  is defined by   0h x  , which gives 
     24 1* 24 1 2hx x c  q q   q  c ; (2) when  ,q2c   , since  is 
strictly convex,  is strictly concave,
 h x
 l x    0sh x  ,  sl x 0 ,19 the optimal choice of 
x  is defined by , which gives    0l x   * l 2 2 2x x c  q q c   ; (3) when 
 q c q ,2,     , since both  h x  and  l x  are strictly concave, , 
,
 sh x  0
  0sl x  20  the optimal choice of x  is also defined by   0l x  , which gives 
 * l 2 22x x c  q q   c ; (4) when    2,q c q,     , since both  and  are 
strictly concave, h x , , 
 h x  l x
  0s   sl x 0  o x  is double-peaked; as a result, we must 
compare  and . It is straightforward to obtain  hh x
 
 ll x
     2 24 1q q  2 22c4 1hh x q      and    2 2 2c2 2ll x c
 
 
q  . 
Since      
 
 
 
 
0 ,
0 ,
q
q
22
2
q
c
4 2
2 2
8 1
2 2
q c q
c q
  2 if
if
 2
22
2 1
2 4
c q 8
1
q
q q
h lx
c
c
h x l
 
  
 
  
     
 



 
  

 

, 
where    , 1q q 8q q 1q 6 q 4       , the original firm’s optimal choice is 
*
hx x  when   2, ,q c q       and is * lx x  when    2q c, ,q      .  
                                                 
 l x18 Since  is strictly concave and   0sl x  ,  l x  ,sx 
 0 0h 
 h x  0 0h 
 is strictly decreasing in the region . Also 
recall . 
 
19 Since  is strictly convex,  and   0sh x  ,  h x

 is strictly  increasing in the region 
0, sx . Since we have commented before, we do not mention it again in the text.  0 0h 
 h x
 
20 Since  is strictly concave and   0sh x  ,  h x  is strictly increasing in the region  0, sx . 
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In the following proposition, we summarize the results and completely characterize 
the entry accommodation equilibrium and entry deterrence equilibrium in the whole 
parameter space of  and,c q  . 
 
 
Proposition 1 
(i) When  2 ,c q 
 
, the original producer's optimal level of deterrence 
is    2* 224 1hx x c q 4 1q q c        . In this case, it accommodates the 
pirate and shares the market with the pirate. 
(ii) When  2 ,c q  , the original producer's optimal level of deterrence 
is * 2l 22x x cq q c    . In this case, it deters the pirate and the pirate 
has no demand. 
 
Summary: The point is if the innovator plays a deterrence strategy when c is low, then it 
may not be optimal to the innovator, an accommodating strategy would be more 
appropriate in this case. Similarly when c is high, accommodating strategy is not optimal 
but the deterrence strategy is.  
 
4. Comparative Statics 
4.1 The relationship between the optimal level of deterrence (x) and the 
degree of IPR protection (c) 
         When 2 ,c q   , i.e. when the original firm always accommodates the pirate, we 
have   
           22 22 24 1 4 1 2 4 1 2 0x c q q q c q q c                   . 
We note that the relationship between the level of deterrence x and IPR protection c is 
complementary.  
 14
At the first instance it may seem surprising that the original producer chooses a 
higher x  when the degree of IPR protection c increases since the intuition would suggest 
that the original producer should reduce x  (in order to save cost) when c  increases since 
a higher c anyway implies a higher cost of piracy. However, under accommodation, one 
should not overlook the other effect of increasing the deterrence level and that is, to 
increase the cost of piracy to the pirate, which makes the pirate less competitive as well. 
The latter effect, which we call strategic effect, turns out to be more beneficial than cost 
saving to the original producer, when it accommodates entry. 
When 2 ,c q   , i.e. when the original firm deters the pirate, we have 
      
2 2
2* 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
2 2
0 if 2
2 2 2 0 if
0 if 2
c q
x c cq q c c q q c q c c q
c q
2 2

     

            
. 
We first compare  ,q   and 2 2q  . Computations yield   2, 2q q    when ; 
and 
0.7239q 
  2, 2q q   q

 when .  Thus we have the following result under deterrence. 0.7239
 
Lemma 1  When 2 ,c q  , i.e. when the original firm deters the pirate, 
(i) if 0.7239 , q  * 0x c   ; however, 
(ii) if 0.7239 , q  * 0x c    as long as   2 2, 2q c q   , and   * 0x c    
when 2 2c q 2 . Thus, in this range of q the relationship between optimal 
level of deterrence and the degree of IPR protection is non-monotonic.  
 
Once the original producer decides to deter the entry, when we see that the 
reliability of the pirated product is not sufficiently high, i.e., when the products are 
already very differentiated, the original producer will give less effort for deterring entry, 
thus will reduce x  when increases. On the other hand, when the reliability of the 
pirated product is sufficiently high, i.e. when the products are not too differentiated, the 
original producer will raise 
c
x  before increases to c 2q  and then reduce x  when 
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c increases further. Thus x and c can be either substitutes or complements, depending on 
the actual parametric configuration.  
Thus, combining the entry accommodation and entry deterrence together we find the 
following.  
 
Proposition 2    
There is a non-monotonic relationship between the level of deterrence and the 
strength of IPR protection as we move from accommodation to deterrence equilibrium.  
 
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the overall relationship between the level of deterrence and 
the strength of IPR protection when 0.5q   and 0.9q   respectively; and we set 1   in 
each figure. 
 
 [Insert Figures 3 and 4] 
 
We believe this is an important result to verify empirically. In the empirical 
literature there are results on the relationship between software copyright protection and 
national piracy rates across countries (see Andres 2006 among others), but there are no 
such studies done at the firm level. The above result, which can be interpreted as the 
relationship between the copyright holder firm’s R&D expenditure to deter piracy and the 
strength of the copyright protection law, forms a suitable hypothesis for empirical testing. 
 
4.2 Rate of Piracy 
We define the ratio of  p o pD D D  to measure the rate of piracy. Thus the higher 
the ratio, the higher will be the rate of piracy. 
When 2 ,c q  
  
, i.e. when the original firm accommodates the pirate, we know  
  2 24 1 4 1 2x c q q q c     
      
  . In this case, it is straightforward to obtain 
2 22 1 4 4 1 2oD q q q q c         ,        22 21 4 2 4 1 2pD q q q c q q q c              
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and the ratio is thus        2 21 4 2 3 1 4 2p o pD D D q q q c q q q c               , which is 
clearly decreasing in c . 
When 2 ,c q 
 q
 , entry is deterred and the rate of piracy is zero. 
 
Proposition 3 
When there is piracy, the rate of piracy is always decreasing in . c
 
This result just follows from our intuition that increasing the strength of IPR 
protection unambiguously reduces the rate of piracy.21  
 
4.3 Rate of Piracy and Quality of the Pirated Product (q) 
When 2 ,c   ,  
         22 2 2 0 when 0.465 3 3 10 4 3 1 4 2 0 when 0.465p o p qD D D q
q
q q c q q q c
q
               
                                                
 . 
 
We thus have the following finding. 
 
Proposition 4  
When  (i.e. when q is small), the rate of piracy is increasing in q , while it is 
decreasing in  when (i.e. when q is large). Thus, the relationship between the 
rate of piracy and the quality of the pirated product is non-monotonic when there is 
piracy. 
0.465q 
q 0.465
 
The intuition for above result is as follows. When a consumer chooses between a 
pirated copy and original copy, she cares about both the reliability/quality and the price 
difference. When a pirated product becomes more and more reliable, the price 
competition between the pirate and the original producer becomes more and more intense, 
the price difference becomes smaller and smaller. This eventually leads to a non-
 
21 Recent empirical study by Andres (2006) also confirms this result.   
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monotonic relationship. When q is small, the price difference effect dominates; whereas 
when is large, the reliability/quality effect dominates. Our interesting finding here is 
against the so-called conventional wisdom. Conventional wisdom would suggest that 
reliable pirated products means higher demand of the pirated good. However, in that 
logic the price difference effect is ignored. As products get less differentiated, lower will 
be the price difference between the pirated and original product. In such situations people 
will tend to buy the original product even if they have to pay little extra. We believe this 
result should also be empirically testable. 
q
 
4.4 The Optimal Reliability of the Pirated Product 
In the light of the above result, from the commercial pirate’s point of view, 
producing a pirated product with moderate reliability is more desirable than one with 
high reliability. 
In this subsection, we are going to illustrate this point more formally. We want to 
endogenize the pirate’s choice of q. It is somewhat a deviation from the model in section 
2, where q is exogenous. Specifically, we now consider a three-period game by inserting 
one period in between the two periods in the original two-period model. In the new-added 
period, the pirate chooses the reliability of the pirated product. 
First note that only when  2 ,c q   the pirate is accommodated. Clearly,  ,q   
is close to 0 when q is either sufficiently close to 0 or sufficiently close to 1.  It is 
straightforward to verify that  ,q  is strictly concave and obtains the maximum 
(0.3545 ) at . So for a given c, the pirate is accommodated only when q is 
intermediate. For example, when 
0.4547q 
2 0.3c  , the pirate is accommodated only when q is 
in the regime  0.2627,0.6596 .  
Next, we will find the optimal choice of q. When the pirate is accommodated, the 
equilibrium prices are given by Eq.(5), and the pirate’s profit is p    
                 22q cxq 1 21 1 14 4 4 1 41 2 2 1 1 2 q qq q q q qq q cx cx q q cx q q cx                  .  
The optimal choice of q is then determined by 0p q   . Straightforward computation 
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yields         3 27 2 11 9 2 2 9 8psign q sign q cx q cx q cx cx            . So the 
optimal choice of q is the solution to the following equation: 
     3 27 2 11 9 2 2 9 8 0q cx q cx q cx cx         .               (10) 
Clearly, when evaluated at q=0, 0p q   , while when evaluated at q=1, 
0p q   . This also shows that the optimal choice of q is intermediate. For example, 
when 1   and cx=0.1, the solution to Eq. (10) is q=0.582. 
Hence, we conclude the following: 
 
Proposition 5 
For a profitable piracy, the optimal strategy of the commercial pirate would be to 
produce a pirated version with moderate reliability. 
 
This implies, in general, a commercial pirate will not be inclined to produce a 
version which is too low in quality or which is too close to the original product in terms 
of quality/reliability even if it has the means to do so. 
 
5. Additive Case of c and x 
Here we briefly analyze the case of additive form of the cost of piracy. Again, there 
are three different strategies for the original producer: accommodation 
strategy,    1 2x q q q   c  ; deterrence strategy,     1 2 2q q q c x q  c      ; 
and blockade strategy, 2x q c  . But the blockade strategy can be ignored since it is 
never optimal for the original producer.  
 
5.1 Accommodation or Deterrence? 
We completely characterize the entry accommodation equilibrium and entry 
deterrence equilibrium in the whole parameter space of  and,c q  . Following the same 
procedure as in Section 3.3, we can obtain the results stated in Proposition 1A.22 
                                                 
22 The detailed analysis is available from authors upon request. 
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Define 
              
22 2
2
1 16 12 6 8 1 2 4 1 2
,
2 2 8 8
q q q q q q q q q q
q
q q q
 
 
          
   

.
 
Proposition 1A 
(i) When 2 , the original producer’s optimal level of 
deterrence is 
  4 1q q q   
   *x c   2q    . In this case, it deters the pirate and 
the pirate has no demand.  
2 2q
(ii) When   4 1q q q    2 , 
(iia) When  ,c q  
  
, the original producer’s optimal level of deterrence is 
    22 2 1 4 1 2x c q q q      
/ 2
. In this case, it accommodates the 
pirate and shares the market with the pirate. 
(iib) When  ,q c q   

, the original producer’s optimal level of 
deterrence is   * 2x c q 2 2q    
c q
 . In this case, it deters the pirate and 
the pirate has no demand. When / 2 , there is no need to deter the pirate 
strategically. Piracy is blockaded anyway due to exogenous high level of IPR 
protection. 
 
      In Proposition 1A(i), the condition   4 1q q q  2    can be interpreted as the 
consumer taste not sufficiently diversified. In such a case, the original producer 
necessarily deters the pirate.  On the contrary, when the consumer taste is sufficiently 
diversified, the original producer deters the pirate only if the degree of intellectual 
property right is high, since the deterrence is too costly if the degree of intellectual 
property right is low. Furthermore, if the degree of intellectual property right is 
sufficiently high, deterrence is blockaded. 
 
5.2 The relationship between the optimal level of deterrence (x) and the 
degree of IPR protection (c) 
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When  ,c q    and   4 1q q q  2   , i.e., when the original firm always 
accommodates the pirate, clearly we have  0x c   . The relationship between x and c 
is always complementary. 
On the contrary, when  , /q c q 2     and   4 1q q q  2   , or when 
,  i.e. when the original firm deters the pirate, clearly, we have   4 1q q q    2
0.x c    Now unlike the multiplicative case, here under deterrence x and c are always 
substitutes. We find no non-monotonicity. 
However, overall, when   4 1q q q  2   , there is still non-monotonicity 
between x and c. Thus we summarize: 
 
Proposition 2A    
When the consumer taste is sufficiently diversified, i.e., when   2 4 1q q q    , 
there is a non-monotonic relationship between the level of deterrence and the strength of 
IPR protection as we move from accommodation to deterrence equilibrium. On the 
contrary, when   2 4 1q q q     , the relationship is monotonic: the higher the 
degree of IPR protection, the lower the level of deterrence. 
 
5.3 Rate of Piracy 
As before, we define the ratio of  p o pD D D  to measure the rate of piracy. 
When  ,c q    and   4 1q q q  2   , i.e. when the original firm 
accommodates the pirate, it can be shown that 
     
    
1 4
3 1 4
q q
q q
 
 
2 4 2
2 1 4 2
p
o p
D q q q c
D D q q q c


         c is decreasing in . 
In all the other cases, entry is either deterred or blockaded; thus, the rate of piracy is 
zero. 
 
Proposition 3A 
When there is piracy, the rate of piracy is always decreasing in c. 
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 5.4 Rate of Piracy and Quality of the Pirated Product (q) 
When  ,c q    and   4 1q q q    2 , simple computation yields 
        
      
2 22 2
2
2 4 4 4 8 8 4 4 4 10 3
3 1 4 2 1 4 2
p
o p
q c q q q q c q qD
q D D q q q q q c
2 

                     
.  
We need to determine its sign under the condition  ,c q    and 
,. Clearly, when   4 1q q q    2 0.465q  , the sign is always positive since 
 and . When , it is hard to determine the sign. 
However, numerical examples illustrate that if q is medium, the rate is decreasing in q 
when c is small while increasing in q when c is big, while the rate is always decreasing if 
q is high. 
24 10 3 0q q   24 8 0q q   0.465q 
In the first example, let 0.5q  , 5  , we thus have  and  , 0.34q   5
   0p o pD D D q     when 0.c 192  and    0pD qp oD D     when 
. In the second example, let  0.192 , 0.345c q    0.47q  , 5  , we thus have 
 and  , 0.340q      0p qp oD D D    when  and 0.021c 
   0p o pD D D q     when  0. , 0.c q  021  340 . In the third example, let 
, 0.6q  5  , we thus have  , 0q   .320  and    0p o pD D qD    when 
 , 0c q   .320 . In the fourth example, let 0.9q  , 10  , (note that 
requires  4 1q q q    2 7.169  ) we thus have  , 0.08 9q   and 
   0p o pD D D q    when  , 0c q  .089 . 
Comparing the pattern of the change of the rate of piracy as the quality of pirated 
products increases between the additive case and the multiplicative case of c and x, we 
find that the pattern is almost the same except that now in the additive case there is a 
range of medium qualities in which the rate of piracy decreases in q when c is small and 
increases in q when c is large.  
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Thus, the above analysis proves the robustness of our main findings. We verify that 
our main results are qualitatively invariant with respect to the multiplicative or additive 
functional form (between c and x) of the cost function.  
 
6. Comments on Welfare 
In this model, it is not difficult to see that the total welfare of the society decreases as the 
degree of IPR protection increases. 23  The idea is when IPR protection is weak, the 
available products (particularly the pirated ones) become very cheap so that almost 
everybody in the economy can afford to buy and use it. This unambiguously increases 
consumer surplus and welfare of the society. In the absence of concerns about R&D 
incentives it follows from standard economic arguments that increase in competition 
(here increase in competition due to the presence of the pirate) must be welfare enhancing. 
However, if we have allowed R&D innovation on quality of the original product, the 
implication on welfare could have been different. In the framework described here, the 
quality of the original product is assumed to be constant; and this is possibly consistent 
with a short-run situation. In general, if the IPR protection is weak in the market, then it 
is unlikely that the product developer would invest to improve upon the quality of the 
product. However, this would eventually reduce the utility and hence consumer surplus 
and welfare in a long-run situation. 
 
7. Conclusion and Extensions  
In this paper, we address the issue of piracy or illegal copying or counterfeiting of the 
original product and Intellectual Property Right (IPR) protections. The original product 
developer makes costly investment to deter piracy in a given regime of IPR protection. In 
this environment, we first characterize completely the entry deterrence and entry 
accommodation equilibrium in the presence of a commercial pirate. We find that it is 
profitable for the original producer to accommodate the pirate when there is weak IPR 
protection, while deterring is profitable when the IPR protection is strong. Next, we ask 
whether the level of deterrence set by the original producer and the degree of IPR 
                                                 
23 The detailed calculation on this result is available upon request from the authors. 
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protection are always substitutes or complements in deterring piracy. In order to answer 
that we find there is actually a non-monotonic relationship between the optimal level of 
deterrence (chosen by the original producer) and the degree of IPR protection in the 
economy. The relationship between the rate of piracy and IPR protection is found to be 
monotonically decreasing whereas the relationship between the rate of piracy and the 
quality of the pirated product turns out to be non-monotonic. Interestingly, on the other 
side, from the commercial pirate’s point of view, the most profitable way to survive in 
the market is to produce a pirated product of moderate quality. Our results also throw 
some light on the incidence of varying rates of piracy across countries and regions, a 
phenomenon observed empirically. From our model, we conjecture that it is mainly the 
interactions of three parameters, namely, the consumers’ willingness to pay for the 
product, the quality of the pirated product and the strength of IPR protection in the 
economy determine the level of piracy in the society.   
In this analysis, we took the level of IPR protection as given. A natural extension 
would be to endogenize that in the model with a view to find the optimal IPR policy. This 
might also give some explanation on the interesting question why IPR regimes differ 
across countries in the first place. In future, we also plan to do some empirical analysis to 
test some of the main findings of this and future analysis. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of buyers when the demand for the pirated product is positive 
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                                  Figure 2a                                        Figure 2b 
 
Best response function                      Best response function 
when    1 2x q q c q               when    1 2q q c q x q     2c  
                          
Figure 2c   Best response function  when 2x q c  
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Figure 3   The relationship between the optimal level of deterrence x and c 
 ( 1  , 0.5q  ) 
 
Figure 4   The relationship between the optimal level of deterrence x and c  
( 1  , 0.9q  ) 
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